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BOOK REVIEWS
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON JuDIaAL TECHNIqUE iN CONFzicr OF

LAws. By Fowler Vincent Harper and Charles W. Taintor If. Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1937. Pp. xxix, 1189.
Two new casebooks on conflict of laws have been published during the
last few years.1 With the new editions of Lorenzen, and with Beale's and
Humbles books also in the field, the teacher of conflict of laws has his
choice of five different casebooks. Is there still room for a sixth? The
answer is in the affirmative if the sixth book is a work of such originality
scholarly achievement and didactical skill as Professors Harper and Taintors
new Cases and Other Afaterials on Judicial Technique in Conflict of Laws.

This book is a work of many novel features, among which the author's
emphasis on the basic general problems of the field of conflict of lawg is the
most imporant Part I, entitled "Foreign Elements in Legal Relations,"
consists exclusively of materials dealing with certain important aspects of
conflict of laws in general In the second division (Parts II-IV), materials
are presented on conflict of laws situations in various branches of procedural and substantive law.
. What judicial technique one applies to conflict of laws problems depends,
to a large extent, upon one's ideas about the social function of this field
of law, and in particular, upon one's answer to the question of why the
law requires courts at all to decide certain cases under the rules of some
law other than that of their own state or country. The materials which
Messrs. Harper and Taintor present on this basic problem are selected and
arranged in such a way as to impress the student with the practical necessity
of uniformity of decision irrespective of where a law suit may happen to be
commenced. A law review artide by Mr. Goodrich is skillfully used as the
cornerstone of this section on "Function and Policy of Conflict of Laws:'
This article culminates in the statement that "both a sense of fairness and a
consideration of general commercial convenience require that when a matter has been settled, in conformity with the law then and there controlling
the actions of the parties, the settlement should not be disturbed because the
point arises for litigation somewhere else. In instances involving personal
reltaions, the appeal for uniform treatment becomes, emotionally, at least,
even stronger.' ' - The student is thus impressed with the fact that the bases
of the conflict of laws do not lie in any "logical" or mystical necessities
or theories but in considerations of expediency and fairness. •
The authors do not open their book, however, with this statement, but
with a chapter on "Postulates and Their Derivatives," in which they expose
their readers to the motley theories which have been developed, not only
in order to explain the strange phenomenon of domestic courts applying
CtmN

(1935); CrEATHAm, GOODRICH, AM

DOWNG (1936).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
foreign laws but also to guide the courts in their practical task. Students
of conflict of laws must have some familiarity with these theories which,
although they may not so much have guided the courts, have furnished
them with the phrases in which to express, and sometimes behind which to
hide, their actual considerations.
The scholars of what may be called the classical school of American
conflict of laws have been blamed for attempting to reduce the conflict of
laws to a small number of basic principles, such as territoriality and personality of laws, from which the solutions of special problems are thought
to be derived.

The Restatement of Conflict of Laws, in particular, which to

a certain extent reflects this attitude, has been attacked by a vigorous opposition. The radical wing of this opposition group advocates that conflict
of laws problems should be solved by a process of trial and error and
patient search for that decision which does the greatest justice to the case
at hand. Significant passages from an article of Professor Cavers,3 one of
the most eloquent advocates of the trial and error method, are reproduced
in Messrs. Harper and Taintor's book.4 They give equal expression, however,
to Professor Goodrich's opinion that the very field of conflict of laws is one
of those where stability and predictability of decision are of the utmost
importance; of greater importance, perhaps, than complete individual equity.,
The methodological approach recommended by the authors themselves in
their "Note on Social Policies in the Conflict of Laws,"" appears as an attempt
to reconcile the ideal of individual fairness and equity with that of predictability of decision, with some preference for individual equity.
The book's initial chapter on function and general method of the conflict of laws is followed by a long chapter (162 pages) on "Devices for
Identifying Significant Foreign Elements (Points of Contact)." It is devoted to the presentation of those factual elements of human relations
which are typically picked by courts and legislators as essential for connecting a factual human relation with the law of a particular state or country.
Materials are presented on eight such "points of contact": nationality, domicil,
place of contracting, place of performance, place of injury, place of doing
business, location of persons and things, and, finally, the forum. An additional section deals with "accumulation of contact points." A teacher devoted
to a purely inductive method of teaching may perhaps prefer to omit this
chapter. It appears quite practicable, indeed, to discuss the various points
of contact in connection with the decisions dealing with particular problems
and to regard such concepts as domicil or situs as catch-words for a variety
of different situations. The facts necessary, for instance, to connect an individual with a state for the purpose of determining the law governing
2

Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1931)
AND TAiNroa 45, 47.
3
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A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rnv. 173, 192.
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5
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45, 50.
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succession to his estate are not the same as those necessary to connect an
individual with a state for the purpose of determining venue in a damage
suit, or the place where a person is entitled to vote or to receive poor relief.
The indiscriminate application of the term domicil to such a variety of different situations has led to much confusion. Messrs. Harper and Taintor's
materials are so chosen, however, that they can well be used as illustrations
of the fallacious character of such uniform concepts, and also as a stimulating
first survey of the entire field of conflict of laws.
The following (third) chapter, entitled "Basic Technical Difficulties,"
appears as the most debatable part of the book. It deals with two topics:
qualification and renvoi. The latter topic has become a familiar object
for law course treatment in recent years. A chapter of more than seventy
pages on qualification, however, is an innovation in an American casebook
on conflict of laws which needs justification. Messrs. Harper and Taintor
seem inclined to believe that the silence so long observed about qualification
by American courts and scholars is due to innocent ignorance. They apparently welcome the appearance of the word "qualification" in recent deisions 7
and the learned discussions of qualification which have recently appeared in
EnglishO
The word "qualification" or "characterization" denotes, primarily, a
basic element of legal thought in general, viz., the subsumption of factual
situations under legal concepts. If a court has to decide, for instance,
whether some transaction is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, it
has to "characterize" the facts, i.e., to determine whether what the parties
did or said constitutes a sale, or a contract to be performed within a year,
etc. In different systems of law, the same set of facts may be charterized
under different legal categories. That such different "qualifications" may
result in obstacles to the achievement of intemational uniformity of decision
was observed almost simultaneously, about the turn of the century. by Etienne
Bartin in France and by Franz Kahn in Germany. Both scholars were concerned with the problem of whether the ideal end of conflict of laws, tiz.,
international uniformity of decision, was ever attainable. Suggestions had
been made for the adoption of uniform conflict of laws rules by all countries
of the world. Working independently of each other, Bartin and Kahn
pointed out that the adoption of such a plan would not lead to real urnformity of decision, because the terms used in the uniform choke-of-law
rules would be interpreted differently in different countries.
Properly understood, this problem is merely one of legislative draftsmanship. It simply implies a warning addressed to draftsmen of intena.
tional conventions and uniform statutes on conflict of laws to make sure that
7 See University of Chicago v. Dater, 277
TAr1roa 248 (1936).

8
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their terms are understood in the same sense by the judges of all the countries concerned.
If the term "question de qualification" referred to no other problem,
practising lawyers and judges would have little concern with it. The term
has been applied, however, by Bartin and his successors, to a number of
different problems, the clarification of which does not appear to be furthered
by their being lumped together under one label. The authors of our casebook have followed the French lead and included in their chapter on
qualification cases on every one of these different problems.
The first problem treated as one of qualification by the French theorists
and their American followers may be illustrated by the case of Boaz v.
Swinney: X was adopted by Y, a resident of Illinois. Y died. When Z,
a brother of Y, died, X claimed a share in immovables left by Z in Kansas,
alleging that under Kansas law an adopted child was entitled to represent
his deceased adoptive father in: the distribution of the estate of a brother
of the adoptive father. Z's other heirs pleaded that under the Illinois Adoption Law the rights of inheritance given to an adopted child were restricted
to inheritance from the adoptive parent. The Supreme Court of Kansas
denied X's share in Z's immovable estate. Twenty years later, in 1929, this
decision was overruled by the Kansas court in In re Reimann's Estate.0
From this latter decision, the authors of our book quote the following
sentence: "We think there is no such status as that of a partially adopted child
any more than there is of a partially married spouse. A child is adopted or
not; a woman is either married or not." This sentence is properly criticized
by Messrs. Harper and Taintor. "Why," so they ask, "can not a woman
be 'partially married'? Indeed, are there not many situations in which she
is married for some purposes but not for others?"" But what has this
case to do with "qualification," i.e., with different conceptual subsumptions
of a certain factual situation in two different legal systems? The authors
seem to believe that the decisions of these cases depended upon different
interpretations of the juristic category "status". Does adoption create a
"status"? If so, its consequences must be governed by the law of the
domicil; if not, the law of the domicil does not apply. This notion is based
on the assumed existence of a choice of law rule that "status" is governed
by the law of the domicil. But is there such a rule? The very problem of
the case seems rather to arise from the fact that such a rule is formulated
too broadly. The problem with which the Kansas court was faced in the
two cases can be formulated as follows: "We do not have in our jurisdiction
an established choice-of-law rule with respect to the inheritance rights of
adopted children in immovables. There are two possible rules which we
can establish, viz.,
"(1)

the right of an adopted child to take land by inheritance is determined by the law of the domicil; and

979 Kan. 332, 99 Pac. 621, HARPER AND TAiNTOR 264 (1909).
10 124 Kam. 539, 262 Pac. 16 (1929).
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the right of an adopted child to take land by inheritance is determined by the law of the situs of the land."

In Boaz v. Swinney, the court adopted rule (1) ; in the later case of In re

Rieanmn's Estate it overruled itself and adopted rule (2).
Of the same type is the problem of the well-known case of Ogden v.
Ogden.s "In this case a Frenchman had married an Englishwoman in
England. He did not have the consent of his parents as required by French

law, although no such requirement was necessary by English law. On his
application, a French court granted a decree of nullity. The Englishwoman

thereafter married an Englishman in England who, after learning of the
previous marriage, brought an action in an English court to have his marriage declared null. The English court decided (1) that English law governed the validity of the first marriage and that by English law, it was
valid....,,Ls

On this case, Messrs. Harper and Taintor comment as follows:
*The court seemed to view the problem as one of a clash of conflict of laws rual
of reference or choice of law; the French law referring the question of parens
consent to the law of the nation, the English law to the place where the marage
ceremony was performed. The court merely elected to follow its own conflict of
laws rule rather than that of France. This is, however, a highly elliptical way of
formulating the problem. A complete statement of the English conflict of Jams
rule governing the validity of a marriage is that (a) matters of formality are
governed by the place of celebration, (b) matters of essentia including cap.ity,
are governed b7 the law of the domicil. The rule is the same in France except thnt
the law of the nation rather th n the domicil governs capacity. FrnCe- was both
the nation and the domicil of the French spouse. It was also the atrimonial
domicil because, under both English and French law, the wife takes the husand's
domiciL Therefore, before the issue could be decided, it was necessary to determint
the preliminary question whether the failure of the Frenchman to obtain his paret"
consent pertained to "formality," under both French and English conflict of las
rules, referable to the place of celebration; or whether it pertained to capacity,
respectively referable to the state of the nation or domicil. Since France regerdcd
the question as one of capacity, the English view that it as one of formlity
results in a lack of uniformity in solution although, were it not for the differect
qualification of the question, the primary conflict of laws rules of the two sW=
would not have so resulted. The failure, however, of the English d-cision to milt
explicit the problem of qualification, tends to obscure the basic nature of the
difficulty."14

One is tempted to ask which statement is "elliptical," that by the. court

or that of our book? To drag in qualiflication seems to me to create a
difficulty where none existed before. What had the English court to decide?
No more and no less than what was the rule of English confict ofliws with
respect to the influence of lack of parental consent upon the validity of a
marriage. From the precedents, the court derived the following rule. The
question of whether or not an official shall assist in a marriage without
being assured of the consent of the parents of the parties, and of how the
1 [19o8 P. 46 (C. A.).
'sP. 292.
14
Pp. 292, 293.
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validity of a marriage is affected by the lack of such consent, is determined
by the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated. As soon as the
court had found that this was the rule of English conflict of laws, the
case was decided. The observation that the French conflict of laws rule was
different was interesting for the English judge to note, but it could not
influence his decision because English courts must follow the English rules
of conflict of laws, and no others. The attempt to look to French and to
English conflict of laws simultaneously can have no other effect than that
of unnecessarily complicating the problem. Only for a law reformer bent
on international uniformity of decision is it important to know that the rules
of English and French conflict of laws lead to different results. He may
consider how a reform of this undesirable situation might be brought about,
perhaps, by suggesting an Anglo-French treaty. For an English judge, however, the French rule is irrelevant.
In all three cases, Boaz v. Swinney, In re Riemann's Estate, and Ogden v.
Ogden, the court had simply either to find out what choice-of-law rule was
already established at the forum or to establish for the forum a new choiceof-law rule for a new case. In this category belong, likewise, the following
cases of Messrs. Harper and Taintor's chapter on qualification:
Minor v. Cardwell:15 Shall the problem of whether or not execution
can be levied upon a married woman's chattels by her husband's creditors
be decided by the law of the situs of the chattel or by the law of the matrimonial domicil?
Woodward v. Woodward:8 Shall the moment at Wvhich a guardian may
be called to settle with his ward be determined by the law of the ward's
domicil or by the law of the court under which the ward's estate is administered?
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway v. Cox:17 Shall the problem of whether
or not a party who has settled a personal injury daim by compromise should
be allowed to sue for an annulment of the compromise and full compensation
for his injuries without previously having tendered the money received under
the compromise, be decided in accordance with the law of the forum or
in accordance with the law of the place of the compromise?
Precourt v. Driscoll:8 Shall the question of which party has the burden
of proof of contributory negligence be determined by the law of the forum
or by the law of the place of the accident?
Sottomayor v. Barros:19 Shall the prohibited degrees and the effects of a
marriage entered into within the prohibited degrees be determined by the
lex loci celebrationisor by the lex domiciii?
The problem of every one of these cases was simply that of finding or
15 37

Mo. 350,

HARPER AND TAXNTOR
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Tem. 644, 11 S. W. 892, HARPER AND TmArOR 267 (1889).
17 171 Ak. 103, 283 S. W. 31, HARPER Am TANTOR 272 (1926).
1885 N.
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establishing the proper choice-of-law rule of the forum. The appearance
that they might have something to do with qualification is created solely by
the fact that the terms in which the traditional choice-of-law rule is expressed
are too broad and too vague
In Ogden v. Ogden, for instance, the English choice-of-law rule was said to be that the formalities of a mraniage
ceremony were determined by the lex loci celebrationis, while the intrinsic
validity of a marriage was governed by the lex domicili. If the choice-of-law
rule is expressed in this form, the problem of the case appears, indeed,
to be that of determining whether parental consent belongs to the formalities
or to the intrinsic validity of a marriage.
Quite different is the problem which is presented by such cases as
Bethell v. Bethell.n In that case a deed for land in Missouri was executed
in Indiana between residents of Indiana. Litigation was started in Indiana
as to whether or not certain covenants should be regarded as being implied
in the deed. No such covenants would be implied in such a deed as that
under consideration by the law of Indiana, while they would be implied
in it under the law of Missouri. The Indiana court held that, while the
law of Missouri alone could determine whether a deed for Missouri land
was suffident to pass the title, the lex loci contractus determined what personal obligations arose out of the transaction. The case is simply an ilustration of the so-called dipefage, i.e., of the phenomenon whereby two different
aspects of a transaction may be governed by two different laws. It seems
that it was pleaded to the court that under the conflict of laws rule of
Missouri the question of what covenants were implied in a deed was govemed by the law of the situs of the land. This allegation vas properly
disregarded by the Indiana court, which had to apply the choice-of-law rules
of Indiana and not those of Missouri.
A third group of problems is presented by the cases of Pleifer v. Wright
and Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Ginrale TransallantiqueF In the
Pfeifer case, the illegitimate daughter of a resident of Iansas sought to
establish her right to a share in land left by her father in Oklahoma. She
alleged that, under a statute of Kansas, she had obtained, through recognition by her father, the legal position of a legitimate child. The Oklahoma
court found that the Oklahoma rules of conflict of laws were as follows:
(1) rights of intestate succession to land are determined by the lex
situs;
(2) the question of whether a person is to be regarded a a legitimate
child of another person is determined by the lex domicifiL
The court then proceeded to interpret the statute of Kansas in order to find

2' For further

dcussion of this problem see Rheinstein, ComparaireLaw =3 Cox-

ilet
of Laws in Germany (1935) 2 U. OF CHL L REV. 232, 265, HaEFpaANDTAwrox
225, 229.
=54 Inc 428, HARPER AND TAnroR 260 (1876).
- 34 F. (2d) 690 (N. D. Okla. 1929), HARPEa
AN TAntroI 266, 732.
343 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), HARER AND TAwnro. 282.
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out whether or not, under Kansas law, the plaintiff was to be regarded as a
legitimate child of the decedent.
In the shipping case, the French Statute of Limitations was pleaded in a
New York court against a claim which would not have been barred by the
Statute of Limitations of New York. The court, again, began by examining
the conflict of laws rules of New York which it found to be as follows:
(1) the question of whether or not a contractual claim is terminated
by lapse of time is determined by the lex loci contraclus;
(2) the question of whether or not enforcement of a still existing contractual claim is barred by lapse of time is determined by the
lex Jori.
Thereupon the court proceeded to interpret the French statute in order to
find out whether, under its terms, the lapse of time had resulted in the
termination of the claim or only in a bar to its judicial enforcement.
In none of these cases does the decision depend on a different "qualification" of the facts under two different laws. They are simply concerned
with the interpretation of a foreign statute referred to by the conflict of
laws rules of the forum.
There remains a final group of cases which may be illustrated by Harralv.
24
Harral.
An American died in France where he had lived for several years
prior to his death. Litigation as to his inheritance arose in New Jersey.
The court found that the New Jersey rule of conflict of laws was that inheritance as to movables was determined by the law of the domicil. Before
answering the question of whether the decedent was domiciled in France
or in New Jersey, the court found it necessary to answer the preliminary
question as to whether domicil should be determined by the criteria of the
law of the forum (New Jersey) or of the law of the country in which the
decedent could hypothetically be domiciled (France). An exactly analogous
problem arose in the English case of In re Annesley. 5 To ask such a
question is legitimate. Each court has, of course, to apply no other conflict
of laws rules than those of its own country or state. It is quite possible,
however, that the conflict of laws rule of the forum contains some blanket
concepts to be filled in by provisions of some foreign law. Almost all countries of the European continent and some Latin-American countries have, for
instance, the choice-of-law rule that a person's capacity to enter upon legal
transactions is determined by the law of the country of which that person
is a national. If a German court, in applying this rule, has to determine
whether a person is or is not a French national, it does not decide this question under the criteria of the German law of nationality but of the French
law on this subject. The determination of whether or not a person is a national of a particular country is left to the law of that country and is not
assumed by the law of the forum. When an American court is faced with
24 39

N. J. Eq. 279 (1884), aff'g 37 N. J. Eq. 458 (1883), HARPER

244.
2 [1926J 1

Ch. 692,

HARPER AND TAiNTOR 237.

AND

TAsNToa

BOOK REVIEWS
the question of whether or not a certain person is a British national, it looks
to the British Nationality Act, not to the United States nationality laws. This
rule is accepted everywhere.
Shall a person's domicil be determined in the same way? Shall an
American court, for instance, in applying the American choice-of-law rule
that succession to movables is governed by the law of the decedent's domicil,
consult the American concept of domicil in order to find out whether or
not a decedent was domiciled in Italy, or shall it apply the Italian notion of
domidil? This question can be answered only by considerations of legal
policy. We have to ask why the rule of American conflict of laws refers
the determination of rights of succession to a person's movables to the law
of that person's domicil. Is it because we in America think that the country
where the decedent is thought to have had his last home, has the closest
connection with the problem, or because we grant the power to determine
those rights to that sovereign who claim that person as domiciled in his
territory? If stated in this way, the problem requires extensive research
in legal history and policy. The answer usually accepted in the United
States is that the domicil of a person must be determined by the American
notions of domicil and not by the notion of some foreign country which
may be essentially different from ours. Simila considerations lead to similar
results with respect to other concepts used in our conflict of laws rules.
But there are exceptions; American conflict of laws rules are different in
many respects for movables and immovables. Succession to movables, for
instance, is determined by the law of the decedent's domicl, while sucson
to immovables is governed by the law of the situs. Which law determines
whether a certain object is movable or immovable, the law of the forum or
the law of the physical location of the thing in question? The usually
accepted answer leaves the determination to the law of the physical location
of the thing. Why? Because the sovereign of that place has the actual
power over the thing. If we classify ("qualify") it as movable while
he calls it immovable, our rule that it should pass to the peon determined
by the law of the decedents domicil is no more than a pious wish.
This problem of whether certain concepts of the conflict of laws rules
of the forum should be detemined by the notions of the law of the forum
or by a foreign law may, if one wishes, be called a problem of "qualification."
Why then, we may ask, after this long discussion, does qualification
occupy such a large place in French doctrine of conflict of laws? It can
probably be explained by the great concern felt by the French scholars for
the ideal end of the conflict of laws, i.e., international uniformity of decision. Differences in the meaning of apparently identical legal terms and
concepts are indeed an obstacle to the achievement of that end. The doctrines brought together under the label "questions de qualification" are ingenious attempts to overcome this obstacle. Such attempts are futile, however, as long as different countries have different choice-of-law rules; and
choice-of-law rules of different countries will be different as long as ideals
about the community interest and distribution of power between various
social groups are different in different parts of the world. Like all law,
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conflict of laws rules are expressions of political power and of social ideals.
Such differences cannot be ironed out by learned doctrines.
Two contradictory ideals permeate the entire field of conflict of laws:

the ideal of international uniformity of decision, and each country's desire
to protect that system of society which it has adopted for itself. "Public
policy" counteracts, to a large extent, the application of a foreign law,
whose application might be demanded by the ideal uniformity of decision.
The French scholars have long regarded public policy as the devil of the
conflict of laws who ought to be fought by all right-minded people. The
result of this attitude is that the French courts themselves have refused to
follow the French professors, although, generally, French courts are inclined
to look for guidance to learned treatises and artides. In the field of conflict
of laws, the French courts have stubbornly refused to follow certain teachings
of the theoreticians. Although resort to public policy is detested by the
professors, the courts are unwilling to apply a rule of foreign law when
they feel that decision according to French law would be more to the
French public interest.
The absence in Messrs. Harper and Taintor's book of any chapter on
public policy, which might appear surprising in a work in which the general
problems of the conflict of laws are so strongly emphasized, can probably
be explained by the dislike of the French theorists for public policy.
I have dwelt on this topic so extensively because I believe that a book
of the excellent qualities of Messrs. Harper and Taintor's work will be
influential; that more discussion is desirable, however, before qualification
is admitted to an established place in American conflict of laws.
On the much discussed problem of renvoi, Messrs. Harper and Taintor
present a more extensive collection of materials than any other American
book. Not only are the American and English cases reproduced, but also
the leading French cases and the writings of their critics. While the Court
of Cassation and the majority of the lower French courts have applied
the renvoi since the famous Forgo case of 1882,20 it is rejected by theorists
and by a minority of lower courts. The considerations of legal policy
which underlie the highly conceptual French discussion might perhaps become
more conspicuous if the authors had reproduced not only the final decision
of the Forgo case but also its earlier stages, especially the pleadings of the
Attorney-General.Y
In this and other respects Messrs. Harper and Taintor have undertaken
to utilize for American conflict of laws the wealth of ideas of the French
theorists. This is a great achievement which may exert a considerable influence on future developments. Perhaps, it may also induce others to pay
attention to the vigorous German school of conflict of laws, which pays
greater attention to political realities than that of France and seems, therefore, to be nearer in spirit to American law.
By its very nature, Conflict of Laws, or, as it is called in Civil Law
Sirey 1882.1.393, Clunet 1882.64, HARPERAND TMrOR 296.
' Sirey, loc. cit. supra note 26.
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countries, Private International Law, is a topic of international interest which
needs international collaboration for its satisfactory development American

conflict of laws has too long emphasized interstate problems at the expense
of its international aspects. Cases dealing with international conflicts of laws
occupy a conspicuous place in Messrs. Harper and Taintor's book. For
didactical purposes, such cases are perhaps better illustrations of the nature
and the peculiar problems of conflict of laws than interstate cases. On the
other hand, it may be regretted that the book does not contain a chapter
on the influence of the United States Constitution on problems of interstate
conflict of laws. The leading cases on this topic are almost all there, bat
their importance might be more apparent if they were assembled in one
chapter.
I have voiced criticisms in this discussion of Messrs. Harper and Taintor's
book. They are meant as expressions of different opinions on controversial
points, but not as reflections on the scholarly or didactical value of the work,
which is evidenced throughout in its provocative originality. Let it be said
in conclusion that in all parts of the book the materials, both cases and
extracts from learned writings, are well chosen. The cases represent the
right proportion between old classics and illustrations of problems of our own
times. Wherever the authors voice their own opinions, they do so in a
well-considered, forceful and thought-provoking way. With its great wealth
of materials, its dear arrangemen and its numerous and extensive authors'
notes, the book will not only be welcome in academic teaching but Rill also
be helpful as a handbook for practitioners.
Afax Rbehwtein
University of Chicago Law SchooL

EQUALTY AND THE L&w. By Louis A. Warsoff. New York: Liveright. 1938.
Pp. xi, 312.
"Case law resembles a patch-work quilt; it is strong and serviceable, but
to see the pattern, you must have distance... ."I Particularly is this true
of that large body of decisions which has been evoked by the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Eiramintion of isolated cases interpreting these clauses reveals
little; true evaluation of the particular case is possible only when its proper
place in the whole judicial current is first charted. And it is with a dear
and scholarly understanding of this necessity for perspective that Professor
Warsoff has prepared his "Equality and the Law," a study of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Starting with the famous Chapter 39 of the Magna Charta and the subsequent interpretation or, better said, misinterpretation of its law of the land
provision, the author first traces the concept of legal equality in England
before the American Revolution and in the United States in the pre-Civil
'Hough, Due Process of Law Today (1919) 32 HAlv. L RIuv. 218.

